Why the Soviet Union Supported German Reunification

The Cold War, with all its dynamics, which spanned the years 1947–1991, had to come to an end as well. One indicator of the Cold War’s end was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the reunification of West Germany and East Germany. This ideological struggle for influence, which lasted over four decades, produced a single winner: the United States, with its ideology of liberalism and capitalism. This meant that the Soviet Union, with its socialism and communism, was effectively sidelined from the ideological competition. As the losing party, the Soviet Union was well aware of its position long before the country dissolved in December 1991. This article will highlight the factors behind why the Soviet Union adopted a policy of supporting the reunification of West Germany and East Germany, even though the Soviet Union had previously been a guardian angel for East Germany and had never been willing to see that eastern “tank state” become part of West Germany, which sided with the United States.

Picture`s Source: Britannica

The Soviet Union was perhaps not as fortunate as the United States and its allies, which remained economically and politically stable despite facing fierce Cold War competition from the Soviet Union and its allies. In other words, as the Cold War drew to a close, the Soviet Union’s economy suffered a severe downturn—or crisis—in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ballooning budget required to prop up pro-Soviet communist regimes in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, North Korea, and Afghanistan, the massive funds poured into arms races and space technology projects, and the substantial financial aid the Soviet Union had to provide to win over countries around the world to the communist ideology—these were the logical reasons why, as the 1990s approached, the Soviet Union faced economic difficulties, which subsequently led to radical changes in the country.

It all began when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. After officially becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and taking the helm of the country, much to the surprise of many, Gorbachev introduced the policies of glasnost and perestroika—policies that were highly unusual in the Soviet Union, as they represented a complete reversal of the Soviet Union’s previous political norms. Glasnost itself means political openness, and perestroika means economic restructuring. These two policies effectively transformed the Soviet Union from a strictly communist state that was opposed to democracy, capital flows, and investment into a politically open country that allowed for the growth of democracy, enabled the people to voice their political aspirations, and, most importantly, permitted the inflow of credit and investment into the Soviet Union.

In response to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had divided West Germany and East Germany, on November 9, 1989, Gorbachev had no choice but to support German reunification, with all its consequences. This was because, at that time, the Soviet Union’s power had already weakened both economically and politically. Had the Soviet Union chosen a military option in response to German unification, a confrontation with the United States and Germany would likely have occurred, which would then have further fueled the outbreak of a new Cold War. Gorbachev then chose the diplomatic option to address German reunification. Diplomatic efforts were initiated by both the Soviet Union and Germany, beginning in March 1990. As a result, the Soviet Union agreed to the unification of West and East Germany, leading to the loss of East Germany’s status as a Soviet ally during the Cold War. Consequently, 300,000 Soviet troops were withdrawn from East German territory. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and Soviet support for German reunification certainly did not come for free—in other words, the price was very high. Why is that? The answer is that nothing is free in politics.

The adage “there’s no such thing as a free lunch” is highly relevant in this context. This is not only because the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership had already undergone an ideological shift—moving away from a conservative stance and no longer adhering to a pure communist ideology that was entirely opposed to openness and a liberal economy—but also because the Soviet Union supported German reunification for economic reasons; at the time, the Soviet Union was in the midst of an economic crisis. Historical facts show that after Gorbachev made the decision to support German reunification—which was followed by Soviet support for Germany’s NATO membership and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from German territory—the Soviet Union subsequently received a credit facility from Germany amounting to 20 billion Deutsche Mark (DM). There is an interesting aspect regarding the 20 billion DM provided by the German government to the Soviet government. One source states that the funds were provided as an incentive to the Soviet Union for agreeing to German reunification and Germany’s accession to NATO. Historically, the provision of this German credit assistance to the Soviet Union originated from a conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in May 1990. At that time, the Soviet Foreign Minister requested a loan guarantee of 20 billion DM. However, Germany only agreed to 5 billion DM.

The situation then became tense, as Germany tried to lobby Western nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which also refused to accept the Soviet demand. Ultimately, President Gorbachev issued an ultimatum to Chancellor Kohl: the final agreement regarding the “Four Plus Two” (US, UK, Soviet Union, France) + (West Germany, East Germany) would not be signed unless both parties (Germany and the Soviet Union) agreed on the extent to which Germany would cover the costs of withdrawing Soviet troops from East Germany. In the end, the West German government relented; they agreed to cover the 20 billion DM in compensation costs for Germany’s reunification and its accession to NATO, as demanded by the Soviet Union. Such a substantial sum was certainly urgently needed by the Soviet Union to fund the existence of the state, which was at that time in the throes of an economic crisis.

At this point, it is abundantly clear that communism, as an ideology, has clearly failed to ensure a nation’s survival; even a nation as vast as the Soviet Union could not maintain the purity of communism—which is opposed to the influx of capital—as it became a pillar of the credit economy and a supporter of the liberal economy. Under such circumstances, it became a rational choice for the Soviet Union to shift its ideological course toward openness and alignment with the Western economy. This revolutionary change then had a systemic impact on the collapse of the Soviet Union, which subsequently gave rise to 15 new nations, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This is a rarely revealed fact regarding the dynamics of world politics leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.