Quo Vadis Thailand-Cambodia Ceasefire and Its Solution

Following a highly deadly open conflict, Thailand and Cambodia, with mediation from the 2025 ASEAN Chair Malaysia, finally agreed to end the war, effective as of 24:00 local time on July 28, 2025. The ceasefire agreement reached by the leaders of the two conflicting nations took place in Putrajaya, Malaysia. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai, who were present representing their respective countries, appeared happy as they shook hands, with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim standing between them. This effectively means that the ceasefire agreement has provided the best possible resolution to the Thailand-Cambodia conflict.

Malaysia, as the host country mediating between the two disputing countries, deserves appreciation. Thanks to Malaysia's vital role in facilitating diplomacy, negotiations, and constructive dialogue, tensions in Indochina involving Thailand and Cambodia have been eased.

Source: Reuters

However, it appears that the ceasefire agreement reached was short-lived. On July 29, 2025, less than a day after the ceasefire agreement was reached, Thailand accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire agreement. Thailand accused Cambodia of launching a military attack on Thai territory.

Thailand responded to Cambodia's actions in a measured manner as part of its self-defense efforts (Itthipongmaetee, 2025). These are the latest facts regarding the Thailand-Cambodia conflict. If this continues to happen, the question then arises: where will the ceasefire agreement, which is believed to be effective in bringing peace to the two nations currently engaged in a heated border dispute (geopolitical) and claims over ancient temples that each conflicting nation asserts as their own, be taken?

To date, the Thailand-Cambodia war, which has involved the use of jets, rockets, and advanced artillery, has claimed the lives of 38 people, with the following breakdown: 11 Thai military personnel, 14 Thai civilians, 5 Cambodian military personnel, and 8 Cambodian civilians. Furthermore, over 138,000 Thai civilians have been displaced, and approximately 140,000 Cambodian civilians have also been displaced since the war erupted on Thursday, July 24, 2025 (Jakarta Post, July 29, 2025).

These facts underscore that the conflict management efforts (diplomatic approach) undertaken by Malaysia as the 2025 ASEAN Chair have been nothing more than empty promises. What steps should ASEAN take to ensure that decisions agreed upon are binding and must be adhered to by ASEAN members or relevant parties?

In short, ASEAN as a regional organization actively engages in activities beyond diplomatic measures in conflict management, such as verbal actions, judicial processes, administrative assistance, and the use of military force (Vukovic, 2016). Of these four activities, verbal actions, judicial processes, and administrative assistance have already been carried out through ASEAN, the ASEAN member state currently serving as ASEAN Chair, the Cambodia-Thailand authorities, and the International Court of Justice. The remaining activity is the need for the presence of a neutral military force tasked with serving as peacekeepers.

Following the example of the United Nations, which has impartial peacekeeping forces that do not take sides and regularly send these forces to conflict areas as peacekeepers, ASEAN should also do the same. This is because the use of neutral military forces is important to ensure that the peace mission on the Thailand-Cambodia border is truly realized. And most importantly, the peacekeeping forces should be granted the authority to take measured and accountable steps to ensure that all conflicting parties do not violate what has been agreed upon.

In the context of the Thai-Cambodian war, the presence of an ASEAN special peacekeeping force whose members come from outside the military personnel of the countries in conflict in the border region between the two countries is absolutely necessary. This will also support the implementation of the Joint Border Committee (JBC) idea, whose members come from Thai-Cambodian representatives.

Reflecting on the failure of the initial implementation of the Thailand-Cambodia ceasefire, this precedent should be evaluated by ASEAN. Whether we realize it or not, this does not merely reflect the failure of two ASEAN member states that are at war. It also indicates the fragility of the ASEAN organizational structure in terms of realizing Southeast Asia as a stable region. The author believes that principles such as non-intervention and consensus, which are fundamental to ASEAN, are worthy of criticism or even consideration as to whether they should be maintained when ASEAN member states are faced with open warfare that results in significant loss of life.

The author sees another shortcoming of ASEAN as the absence of an enforcement agency that is ready to take firm action against any ASEAN member that violates the consensus. A ceasefire solution that has been agreed upon by each of the warring countries without follow-up monitoring and punishment mechanisms will only serve to sweeten the conflict because of its vulnerable nature. Therefore, in addition to peacekeeping forces, ASEAN should establish an institution such as the ASEAN Conflict Supervision and Quick Response Mechanism, which has the authority to act swiftly, independently, and whose existence and legitimacy are recognized. With this, the hope is that what has been agreed upon will truly be implemented, thereby saving the lives of civilians who are unaware of the conflict.